When and to what extent do crises and signi cant events induce changes in political attitudes? Theories of public opinion and policymaking predict that major events restructure public opinion and pry open new political opportunities. We examine the e ect of major events on support for public policies in the context of the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting in December 2012 using a nationally representative panel survey of U.S. adults. Across both cross-sectional and within-subject analyses, we nd no evidence that Americans granted greater support for gun control after the Sandy Hook shooting. Our null ndings persist across a range of political and demographic groups. We also nd no evidence of attitude polarization as a result of Sandy Hook. Our results suggest that elite polarization in a particular issue area leads citizens to employ motivated reasoning when interpreting critical events, thereby reducing the capacity for attitude change. Our ndings have important implications for identifying the conditions under which major events a ect support for public policies and create political opportunities for policy change.
After Barack Obama's election as President of the United States, incoming chief of sta Rahm Emanuel remarked: "You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. . . This [economic] crisis provides the opportunity for us to do things that you could not do before. " 1 Emanuel's comments indicated a belief that the public would support measures during a deepening recession that would be less palatable in more normal times. More broadly, Emanuel's remarks describe a malleable public willing to revise its beliefs when the context calls for it.
When and to what extent do major crises and events induce political attitude change ? Carmines and Stimson (1989, 160) theorize that mass popular opinion on an issue may be transformed by "critical moments" which "[set] the stage for an evolutionary change that follows. " Kingdon (1995) uses similar language to describe how "focusing events" provide opportunities for policy changes that may not otherwise exist. Crises or disasters "call attention to a problem" (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 95) , leading citizens to attach powerful symbols to these events and personalize their consequences. The salience of these events coupled with the problems they highlight set into motion the conditions for attitude change (Zaller 1992) . Given changes in public opinion attributable to in uences such as framing and priming (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007) and events that are somewhat less salient, such as Supreme Court rulings (e.g., Christenson and Glick 2015) , it would be surprising if critical moments did not a ect public opinion. Indeed, such events have been credited with producing attitude change across a range of domains, including foreign policy (Mueller 1973) , civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004) , gay rights (Brewer 2003) , and climate change (Krosnick et al. 2006) .
In this paper, we study attitude change toward gun control in response to the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, which generated international attention and renewed public calls for more restrictive gun control measures. Few events in the United States in recent years have attracted greater national and international media coverage than mass shootings in places including Virginia Tech, Fort Hood (Texas), Aurora (Colorado), San 1 Gerald F. Seib, "In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, " Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2008.
Bernandino (California), Orlando (Florida), and Las Vegas (Nevada). Using data from a nationally representative panel survey of U.S. adults, our results are mostly null. Across both cross-sectional and within-subject analyses, we nd no evidence that Americans granted greater support for gun control after the Sandy Hook shooting. These results persist across a range of political and demographic groups. We also nd no evidence of attitude polarization as a result of Sandy Hook. Our results suggest that elite polarization in a particular issue area leads citizens to employ motivated reasoning when interpreting critical events. Under these conditions, pre-existing attitudes are reinforced, thereby reducing the capacity for attitude change. Our ndings further suggest important limits to the potential for major events to reshape public support for public policies.
Critical Events and Attitude Change
While prominent theories of public opinion posit that arbitrary and con icting attitudes contribute to high levels of opinion instability (e.g., Converse 1964; Zaller 1992) , other research has long suggested that macro-and micro-level changes in opinion are systematically connected to major political events (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992) . Major events may lead citizens to update their opinions based on their proximity to the event or through interpretations provided by political elites and through mass media (Page and Shapiro 1992, 321) .
Political elites and the media contextualize and frame events to provide a sense of the need for potential policy changes. Citizens receive these messages and decide whether to update their attitudes. Attitude change in response to major events is not guaranteed, however. Political predispositions can in uence how citizens respond to major events (e.g., Feldman and Conover 1983) . For instance, whatever new information an individual encounters through an event, she could respond by rationalizing the consequences through her partisanship so as to rea rm her predispositions about the relevant issue. Thus, major events may not necessarily reshape attitudes toward relevant policies, but instead could strengthen them in line with preexisting positions.
We argue that attitude change following critical events depends upon the degree of elite con ict in the relevant policy domain. Elite polarization increases citizens' use of motivated reasoning (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013) , which structures how individuals perceive critical events and a ects their willingness to revisit their preexisting attitudes. Elite con ict produces competing frames in how individuals attribute or explain major events, and motivated reasoning leads citizens to choose a frame that is consistent with their partisan and ideological beliefs. Thus, critical events may be unlikely to produce opinion change involving issues on which there is high elite polarization.
We study attitude change in response to the December 14, 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. One gunman killed 27 victims, 20 of whom were students. Mass shootings may serve as focusing events for American public opinion. School shootings receive especially high levels of media coverage and public visibility, and the everyday context of the shooting enables citizens to relate to the event and form an opinion on the relevant policy issue. 2 Existing scholarship provides little direct evidence of individual-level attitude change in response to the events, due largely to the absence of data that allow researchers to compare post-event attitudes with those provided before the event. In the context of mass shootings, previous research documents strong support for gun control after shootings (Barry et al. 2013) and shows that views on gun control respond to media frames (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001), but does not directly investigate attitude change.
2 Newtown was not the rst mass shooting yet it attracted much more attention than shootings of similar magnitudes. A New York Times search for stories in the month after the events shows 386 stories for "Newtown" compared with 151 stories of the Aurora, CO shooting ("Aurora") in 
Data
We examine the e ect of the Sandy Hook shooting on attitudes toward gun control using data collected as part of The American Panel Survey (TAPS), a monthly panel survey completed online from a national probability sample of approximately 2,000 U.S. adults. 3 We measure attitudes toward gun control with responses to the question: "Federal law should ban the possession of handguns except by law enforcement personnel, " which closely matches an item asked by Gallup since at least 1959. 4 Though this question may not be ideal in the context of Sandy Hook, it has the virtue of being asked in both December 2012 and January 2013 and is highly correlated with related questions asked on later TAPS surveys, including whether respondents supported bans on semi-automatic weapons (r = 0.62). 5 Responses were provided along a ve-point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).
We conduct two sets of analyses. In addition to comparing aggregate opinion change in response to the Sandy Hook shooting, we consider how the shooting's e ects vary across a range of individual characteristics. Thus, we also evaluated attitude change among politically and demographically relevant groups based on partisanship, ideology, sex, parenthood, geographic proximity to Newtown, and membership in the National Ri e Association. 6 6 Partisanship is measured using responses to the standard question, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?" Approximately 38.3% of the sample identi ed as Democrat, 26.0% as Republican, and 35.7% as Independent.
Ideology was measured using self-placement on a seven-point symbolic ideology scale, where respondents who identi ed as "very liberal", "liberal", or "somewhat liberal" were classi ed as liberals (35.2%) and similar for conservatives (39.6%), while respondents who placed themselves at the midpoint were classi ed as moderates (25.2%). We distinguished respondents with and without children because most of the victims of Sandy Hook were young children. We also investigated whether proximity to Newtown was associated with opinion change and identi ed those panelists living in New England or New York were classi ed as living in the "Northeast" (9.4%). Finally, due to the small fraction of the sample that reported being NRA members we focused on the non-NRA
Results
We performed our main analyses by comparing the proportions of respondents who supported gun control before and after the Sandy Hook shooting. 7 For simplicity, we report results when collapsing the ve-point response variable to distinguish respondents who "strongly" or "somewhat" agreed with banning handguns from those who disagreed or chose the middle (neutral) response option, but note that we nd identical patterns of results when using the full ve-point scale.
Our primary results are displayed in Figure 1 3) between these levels of support. Among respondents who completed the survey after Sandy Hook, support for a handgun ban was somewhat higher among liberals, women, those in the Northeast, and respondents without children, and was somewhat lower among moderates, conservatives, men, and parents. None of these di erences, however, is statistically or substantively signi cant.
We also nd little evidence that Sandy Hook increased support for gun control when examining members for this comparison. Figure 1 shows. Overall support for gun control among this sample decreased from 21.9% prior to Sandy Hook in December 2012 to 18.0% in January 2013. Support increased modestly among Republicans but the di erence is not statistically signi cant. Interestingly, support for gun control signi cantly decreased among Independents, liberals, conservatives, women, and respondents without children. Across both cross-sectional and panel analyses, we uncover no evidence that the Sandy Hook shooting increased Americans' support for restrictive gun control measures. These largely null e ects persist across partisan, ideology, and demographic groups, some of whom may have been more likely to undergo attitude change in response to the tragedy. To the extent our analyses identify any statistically signi cant patterns, moreover, we nd that support for gun control decreased in the aftermath of the shooting.
We further explore whether attitudes toward gun control polarized after Sandy Hook. The comparisons shown at the top of each plot in Figure 1 We expect that attitudinal polarization would result in larger mean di erences after Sandy Hook.
The results are displayed in Figure 2 Note: Plots show the di erences in mean placement along the ve-point scale for each of the comparisons shown along the y-axis, and larger values along the x-axis indicate greater di erences in mean placements. DEC12 indicates polarization levels before Sandy Hook and JAN13 indicates polarization levels after Sandy Hook. The horizontal lines are the 95% con dence intervals of the mean di erences.
Conclusion
On January 16, 2013, President Obama and Vice President Biden announced a series of executive actions on gun control. Biden described a shifting landscape of public opinion on this issue: "I also have never seen the nation's conscience so shaken by what happened at Sandy Hook. The world has changed, and it's demanding action. " 8 In Biden's telling, public opinion had demanded increased restrictions on gun ownership in response to the Sandy Hook tragedy.
Using the strongest possible research design possible short of random assignment, our results suggest that, in contrast to the hopes of Obama and Biden, the Sandy Hook shooting had little 8 The White House, O ce of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President and the Vice President on Gun Violence, " January 16, 2013. e ect on public support for gun control. To be sure, we believe Americans were deeply sympathetic to the victims and their families. But not only do we nd no aggregate e ects, we also nd no evidence among subgroups that may be expected to experience especially large attitude changes in response to such events. We further nd no evidence of attitudinal polarization after Sandy Hook. Instead, American public opinion on gun control appears to be deeply entrenched.
The ndings shown here indicate that not all major events are created equally nor do they all have the same predictable impact on public opinion. Instead, as our argument suggested, major events may not lead to signi cant changes in public opinion when political elites are highly polarized on the relevant issue area. These conditions would not appear to characterize gun control, a publicly salient issue in recent decades and on which Democratic and Republican elites have clearly distinct positions. Under these circumstances, processes of motivated reasoning may cement public opinion in response to major events, no matter how personally compelling. If the victimization of more than 20 children and their teachers by mass gun violence does not produce attitude change on gun control, we believe it is unlikely that other instances of mass shootings may do so. Nevertheless, identifying the conditions under which signi cant events reshape public opinion and the possibilities for policy change remains an important subject for further theoretical and empirical research. 
A Supplementary Appendix

C Response Rates
AAPOR response rates are reported in Table C .1. The rst column reports each wave's individual response rate (RR) without accounting for e, the estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that is eligible. When accounting for e, as is the case in column 2, the response rate is much higher. The third column represents the completion rate for each month. This gure is calculated by dividing the number of completed surveys in a given wave by the number of panelists who were invited to take the survey that month. 
